From Nations to Union: The Case for a Federal Europe
By Martin Bajada
Federalism emerged as a foundational vision for European unity in the aftermath of the Second World War, grounded in the belief that supranational governance could prevent the resurgence of nationalism and war. The intellectual cornerstone of this vision was the Ventotene Manifesto (1941), authored by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi while imprisoned under Mussolini’s regime. It called for a ‘free and united Europe’ built through a federation of states that would replace the sovereign nation state as the focus of power (EPRS, 2024a). This manifesto catalysed the formation of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) in 1946, a transnational political movement committed to federal integration. The UEF played a significant role in shaping the broader European Movement, influencing the discourse and institutional design of post-war reconstruction. Early European institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) reflected federalist aspirations by pooling sovereignty in key economic sectors. Notably, the failed attempt to establish a European Political Community (EPC) in the early 1950s, linked to the European Defence Community, marked a bold but premature federalist initiative. Although it collapsed under French opposition, it demonstrated the willingness of post war leaders to move beyond intergovernmentalism toward a supranational European political order.
Following the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, Altiero Spinelli revitalised federalist momentum from within the institution itself, recognising the Parliament as a legitimate platform for constitutional transformation. In 1980, he founded the Crocodile Club, an informal coalition of like-minded MEPs committed to advancing European Federalism. This group played a pivotal role in drafting the Draft Treaty on European Union (DTEU) in 1984, which proposed transforming the European Communities into a genuine political union with a directly elected parliament, common foreign policy, and shared budgetary powers. Although not adopted by the Member States, the DTEU significantly influenced subsequent treaty reforms. This legacy was institutionalised through the creation of the Spinelli Group in 2010, which renewed efforts to place federalism at the heart of EU reform debates. As noted in the European Parliamentary Research Service briefing, the Group aims to revive the momentum towards federalism by promoting debate and legislative initiatives within the EP (EPRS, 2024a). Across decades, federalist activism has remained anchored in constitutional priorities such as subsidiary, European citizenship, the protection of fundamental rights, and the democratisation of EU governance through direct parliamentary elections. As it is held, the European Parliament must become the engine of integration, a goal that continues to guide federalist advocacy today (Janning, 2012).
Contemporary federalist proposals build on historical ideals but respond directly to the EU’s present day structural limitations. The Political Union paper outlines a compelling vision for a stronger, more democratic Union centred on concrete institutional reforms. Key among these is the creation of a European treasury with independent fiscal capacity, enabling the EU to manage macroeconomic shocks and pursue common investment strategies. Mutualised debt instruments, such as Eurobonds, are proposed to enhance financial solidarity and prevent asymmetric crises across Member States. The paper also calls for a unified foreign and defence policy, arguing that it is ‘entitled ‘Promoting Europe’s interests and values in the world,’ and urges a redistribution of competences to empower the Commission and Parliament as central executive and legislative bodies (EPRS, 2024b). These reforms echo demands in the Manifesto for the Future of Europe and the Manifesto for a Federal Europe (Ventotene, 2022), which advocate for treaty change to enshrine transnational electoral lists and the Spitzenkandidaten system, which is a political process used in the EU to determine who is to become the president of the European Commission, as mechanisms for democratic legitimacy. Without structural reform, federalists argue, the Union risks stagnation under a fragmented institutional model. As the paper warns, incrementalism has reached its limits; only a clear federal constitution can deliver coherence, accountability, and resilience in the face of 21st century challenges (Janning, 2012).
Despite the enduring intellectual and institutional foundations of European federalism, its political influence has diminished in recent years. The Spinelli group once a symbol of parliamentary federalist activism, has seen its share of MEPs decline from 15% in 1986 to just 10.7% in 2024 reflecting a broader retreat in federalist momentum within EU institutions. This decline coincides with the rise of populism and nationalist rhetoric across Member States, which challenge the legitimacy of supranational governance and fuel scepticism towards deeper integration. Meanwhile ongoing geopolitical crisis, including Russian aggression, instability in the EU’s neighborhood and increasing US-China tensions, demands a unified and strategic European response that current intergovernmental mechanisms struggle to deliver. A federal Europe would enable more coherent action through centralised authority, enhancing both democratic legitimacy and strategic autonomy. Without such reforms, the EU risks further fragmentation, decision-making paralysis, and a diminished role on the global stage. The intergovernmental model, reliant on consensus and national vetoes, is ill-equipped to address transnational crises swiftly and effectively. In this context the federalist vision remains the most coherent and future oriented path: a Europe that is democratic, resilient, and capable of acting decisively in a rapidly changing world.
References
European Parliamentary Research Service. (2024a). Federalism in the European Parliament: The Spinelli Group and the Federalist Tradition (EPRS_BRI(2024)760354_EN). Brussels: European Parliament.
European Parliamentary Research Service. (2024b). Strategic Agenda 2024–2029: Overview and Analysis (EPRS_BRI(2024)762863_EN). Brussels: European Parliament.
European Policy Centre. (2012). Political Union: Europe’s Defining Moment. Brussels: EPC.